National Defence Strategy 2026: Spending on military cyber capability to reach at least $15b

At its simplest, the government is promising to deliver “Strengthened cyber capabilities to protect networks and systems, and provide enhanced cyber and electronic warfare effects”.

And while it’s a vast simplification to break things down in such a way, the word “cyber” gets exactly 17 mentions throughout the 102-page document released today by the Department of Defence – and none of those in a headline manner.

But those mentions are everywhere, and make a very strong case that the cyber domain is an essential one.

Strategic truths

Cyber security challenges feature heavily in the first part of the document, which outlines the broader strategic environment Australia currently finds itself in.

Whether it be “cyber intrusions” conducted by any number of authoritarian regimes (alongside the challenge of combatting both misinformation and disinformation), the fact that our traditional geographical advantages being offset by advanced cyber capabilities that can reach across borders at the speed of information, or the fact that cyber is now a key warfighting domain, there’s no doubting that Australia sees cyber as a foundational presence, both on the battlefield and defending the national interest.

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“Cyber and space capabilities are playing a growing role in military operations,” the Strategy says in regard to advances in technology and the changing character of war.

“Malign actors – both state and non-state – are continuing to improve their cyber capabilities, increasing the risk of disruptions to Australia’s critical systems, infrastructure and networks.”

National defence blues

Given the size of Australia, the movement of materiel and other defence assets from the southern regions of Australia to the top end, where extended combat operations are most likely to take place.

Critical infrastructure such as roads, ports, and railways is paramount to moving these necessities about the county, as is the infrastructure needed to keep operations running long-term.

“Efforts to improve healthcare systems and cyber security and protect critical infrastructure will also support the availability of essential services,” the NDS says.

“The Commonwealth will continue to engage state and territory governments, industry partners and civil society to address areas of highest risk.”

Denial

Broadly speaking, Australia’s defence strategy has always been one of denial.

Strategically, the nation seeks to deter our enemies, shape the combat environment in our favour, and then respond with “credible military force” when it is actually required.

“The Government’s Strategy of Denial aims to deter any conflict before it begins, prevent any potential adversary from succeeding in coercing Australia through force, support regional security and prosperity and uphold a favourable regional strategic balance,” the NDS says.

“It guides Defence’s contribution to National Defence and spans all five domains – maritime, land, air, space and cyber.”

There are a couple of interesting points explored in this section of the document.

For one thing – as an aside outside of the cyber domain – the United States is still embedded as a key point of strength as an ally. The ADF is effectively meant, if Australia is attacked, to “hold” an adversary at bay and wave our friends across the Pacific as a big stick while we talk as softly as we can in the region.

“It involves working with the United States and key partners to contribute to regional stability and security and strengthen deterrence against the threat of military coercion or a conflict,” the NDS says.

Whether this attitude reflects current realities remains to be seen.

That aside, while Australia’s military strategy is largely static and designed around deterrence and denial, the NSD admits that geography is no longer a hard limit – and our first, best defence. Rather, the document acknowledges that “developments in cyber, space, nuclear and long-range precision strike mean Australia’s security interests are not bound by geography alone”.

The future

Much of NDS 2026 focuses on work that has already been done and commitments already made, but looking ahead, cyber is a key feature of Australia’s future warfighting mix.

Cyber capabilities, alongside space in a similar manner, are expected to boost situational awareness and improve force projection.

Continued investment in REDSPICE is expected to continue to deliver the capability needed by the Australian Signals Directorate and provide uplift to communications and cyber defence postures.

However, NSD 2026 admits this is not a mission to be undertaken alone.

“The Government will continue to strengthen defence engagement with other Southeast Asian partners, including Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and Timor-Leste,” the NDS says.

“This cooperation will support regional and maritime security, uphold sovereignty, enhance interoperability, address common challenges such as cyber security and climate change and support a favourable regional balance of power.’

Finally, as the world continues to see not just evolutions in warfighting capabilities, but whole new revolutions, NDS 2026 acknowledges that cyber capability must keep pace.

“Defence is contributing to the collaborative development of capabilities that can be force multipliers and provide asymmetric advantage,” the NDS says.

“This includes advancements in undersea warfare, hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, artificial intelligence and autonomy, electronic warfare, quantum technologies and advanced cyber.”

Defence Minister Richard Marles, when he announced the new strategy, made the point that in this day and age, all five domains matter.

“We are building an ADF that is integrated across all five domains – including space and cyber – that works in concert with other arms of national power and with our partners.”