Keith Bulfin 
The recent breach impacting the Victorian Department of Education – alongside a string of similar incidents – should not be viewed as isolated cyber events. They reflect a broader structural shift in how organised crime groups generate revenue.
From data theft to revenue infrastructure
When a school system is breached, public attention typically focuses on immediate disruption, reputational damage, and potential ransom payments. But the ransom demand is often only the visible layer of a much larger economic chain.
Large-scale institutional datasets – particularly those containing student and employee records – represent durable, monetisable infrastructure. They are valuable not just because of what they contain today, but because of how long that data remains useful.
Student information is especially attractive. Unlike compromised adult credentials, which may quickly trigger monitoring alerts, student identities can be exploited over many years. Personal details harvested from education systems can be used to:
- Construct synthetic identities.
- Facilitate long-term financial fraud.
- Enable credential-stuffing attacks.
- Support access brokerage in other sectors.
- Aggregate into larger resale data packages.
This shifts the breach from a one-off cyber incident to a recurring criminal revenue stream.
Why education is an attractive target
Organised crime groups pursue targets that combine scale, predictability, and manageable resistance. Education systems meet all three criteria.
First, data density. A single department-level breach can expose hundreds of thousands – or millions – of records in one event.
Second, budget fragmentation. Schools and education departments often operate with uneven cyber security maturity across institutions.
Third, political sensitivity. Education systems are publicly accountable and politically exposed, increasing pressure to respond quickly.
Finally, perceived retaliation risk. Unlike banks or defence infrastructure, schools are not traditionally framed as critical infrastructure in threat actor calculations.
The ransomware-organised crime nexus
Modern ransomware operations rarely function as isolated hacker groups. Many now operate as structured enterprises with defined roles: developers, access brokers, negotiators, and financial facilitators.
Revenue diversification is common. Groups may:
- Demand ransom for decryption.
- Threaten staged data leaks.
- Resell stolen datasets.
- Auction network access.
- Use harvested data for downstream fraud.
Education breaches feed into this broader ecosystem. Even if a ransom is not paid, the data retains secondary market value.
This reframes the issue. We are not simply dealing with cyber security gaps – we are observing organised crime portfolio expansion.
Policy implications
If education systems are treated solely as IT victims, mitigation efforts will remain narrow. A more effective response requires recognising education data as high-value economic infrastructure.
Key considerations include:
- Sector-wide minimum cyber resilience standards.
- Centralised breach response coordination.
- Financial intelligence tracking of ransomware payment flows.
- Reframing education as critical infrastructure.
- Cross-sector intelligence sharing between banks, insurers, and education departments
Beyond IT: A financial intelligence problem
The education sector’s vulnerability is not primarily a technology issue. It is an economic one.
Organised crime groups target sectors that generate scalable, renewable returns with manageable risk. Education systems, by virtue of their data volume and public visibility, now sit within that calculus.
If we respond only at the firewall level, we risk underestimating the strategic dimension of the threat.
Education data must be treated as high-value economic infrastructure. That requires closer collaboration between cyber security teams, financial intelligence units, and policy leaders.
Recognising the economic logic behind these attacks is the first step towards disrupting them.
Keith Bulfin is a financial intelligence specialist and author with a background in organised crime analysis and institutional risk exposure.